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The topic of civil rights is a topic that I have thought about for a
long time and written about and feel very committed to, and I
thank the editors of the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary
for inviting me to give the closing remarks. I am heartened by the
commitment of our students at St. John's University School of
Law in recognizing the importance of the rights of the disabled
and civil rights in general.
First, I would like to place my summation in the context of civil
rights, which is what I know most about. Some of our speakers
today have taken us back historically; Judge Re to Roman law,1
another speaker to Ancient Greece,2 and yet another to the Thir-
teenth Century.3 What I am going to do is move us closer in time
to 1954 and the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.4 Now you might ask, "What does Brown have
to do with employment rights of the disabled? Wasn't it a case
about race and education?" Technically, yes but philosophically
and politically it was not.5 In fact, Brown's central statement was
about the right to be free from state action implying inferiority.6
In other words, for the Court in Brown, the Equal Protection
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Brooklyn College; M.A.,
Hunter College; Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Columbia
Law School.
1 See Edward D. Re, Introductory Remarks, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 477, 479
(1994).
2 See Deborah A. Calloway, Dealing with Diversity: Changing Theories of Discrimina-
tion, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL ComrMNT. 481, 481-83 (1994).
3 See David Popiel, Americans with Disabilities Act: A Question of Economics or Justice,
10 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527, 529 (1994).
4 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
5 Id. at 495 (concluding that in field of public education, "separate but equal" doctrine
has no place, and separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
6 Id. at 493. The court described education as the most important function of state and
local governments. Id. Therefore, where a state has undertaken to provide education, it
must make education available to all on equal terms. Id.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees each of us the
right to equal dignity and respect at the hands of government.
Now, despite all of the debate about judicial activism and judi-
cial restraint, we know that courts actually frame their decisions
within the cultural paradigms of the accepted social values of the
day.7 In that sense, Brown can be viewed as reflecting what were
the emerging understandings, sensibilities, and perspectives cap-
tured in the timeframe of 1954.
As we now realize four decades later, Brown was a bold and dra-
matic decision with bold and dramatic consequences that far ex-
ceeded the facts of the case. In fact, Brown set in motion a polit-
ical and social revolution that would heighten our awareness of a
broad spectrum of individuals and groups historically forgotten,
including women, linguistic minorities, racial minorities, and the
disabled.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Congress breathed life into
Brown's mandate by enacting a series of laws protecting the rights
of racial and linguistic minorities,8 women, 9 handicapped chil-
dren,10 and disabled adults," by providing them with a wide
range of public services. Even though Brown was decided under
7 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 134-35 (1991) (standing for proposition that
Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona understood importance of social tolerance, mobility,
and social change); Mary A. Glendon, Symposium, General Report, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
385, 406-07; Daniel Gordon, California Retreats to the Past: The Paradox of Unenforceable
Immigration Law and Edwards v. California, the Depression, and Earl Warren, 24 Sw. U.
L. REv. 319, 347 (1995); Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an Age of Rela-
tivism, 18 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 363, 368-70 (1993) (explaining importance of Supreme
Court Justices' social values because it will color his or her decisions); Robert Holland,
Women Could Be the Biggest Loser If VMI Falls, RicHMoND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 28,
1994, at A3 (quoting justice Department release that VMI should allow female students in
"spirit of the Brown decision").
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race, color, or
national origin in federally funded programs or activities).
9 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation on basis of sex in federally funded educational programs or activities).
10 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V 1993) (providing that "[n]o other-
wise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall solely by reason of his handicap, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance"); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. V 1993) (requiring states to provide all
handicapped children between ages of 3 and 21 with "free appropriate education" in "least
restrictive environment).
11 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
federal employers from discriminating against handicapped persons); Section 503 prohibits
employers holding contracts with federal government in excess of $2500 from discriminat-
ing against handicapped persons. Id. § 793. Section 504 prohibits recipients of federal fi-
nancial assistance from discriminating against handicapped persons. Id. § 794.
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the Fourteenth Amendment, which only reaches state action, laws
prohibiting discrimination were also applied to private actors. For
those protected, these laws transformed group membership from a
negative to a positive factor.
The history of employment for the disabled has been one of in-
sensitivity, misunderstanding and exclusion. It was not until
1968, in fact, that federal law manifested a changed mindset in a
relatively modest law aimed to promote fuller participation in the
mainstream for people with disabilities. 12 The Architectural Bar-
riers Act 13 required that newly renovated federal buildings be ac-
cessible to those with disabilities. The law was only one page in
length and contained no enforcement provision. Nevertheless, it
represented a step toward changing the national perspective on
people with disabilities.
Throughout the 1970s, advocates for the disabled made addi-
tional gains in state legislatures and in Congress, through laws
aimed at promoting the equal participation of the disabled, in
such areas as education, transportation, health care, housing, vot-
ing accessibility and employment. As a matter of public policy,
the approach was piecemeal and the scope was limited.' 4 The Re-
habilitation Act of 1973,15 for example, was the major piece of leg-
islation protecting the rights of disabled adults at that time. This
tersely worded statute applied a non-discrimination strategy only
to federally funded programs.
It was not until 1990, through the Americans with Disabilities
Act,16 that we finally see a dramatic broad-based shift in public
policy toward inclusion of the disabled in the area of employment.
For the first time, federal law explicitly noted that, "the Nation's
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency." 17
12 See Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-57 (1988).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15 Id.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. V 1993).
17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. V 1993) (describing Congressional findings and pur-
poses of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); see also Elizabeth C. Morin, Americans
with Disabilities Act 1990: Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. Rv.
189, 201-02 (1990) (comparing ADA with prior legislation).
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Similar to earlier rights-based movements promoting equality
for racial minorities and women,"8 the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA") encompasses two basic principles. The first is a
non-discrimination principle whereby differences based on disabil-
ity are, in some circumstances, irrelevant to the distribution of so-
ciety's resources.' 9 Here, equal treatment is required. The second
principle is one of affirmative accommodation whereby formal
equality, or equal treatment, may not be appropriate. 20 In other
words, for certain members of our society to live with dignity and
respect and to fully participate, equal opportunity does not mean
merely "same" treatment, but rather "different" treatment.
For some, this concept of equality may demand a redistribution
of society's resources to provide more goods or benefits based on
group characteristics. In a world of finite and shrinking re-
sources, this latter principle which is embedded in the ADA pits
the needs of the protected minority against the interests of the
majority. After all, we do not operate behind John Rawls' "veil of
ignorance,"21 and so self-interest inevitably comes into play.
While Rawls would warn us not to plug the rights of the disabled
into a utilitarian calculus, there is always the temptation to do
so. 22 This is where we find the most intractable implementation
problems, and the most political controversy.23
Similar to other rights-based movements, full equality of oppor-
tunity for the disabled, despite its initial promise, has not oc-
curred magically, with the stroke of a legislative or administrative
18 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
19 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-165 (Supp. V 1993).
20 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (Supp. V 1993).
21 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1971).
22 Id. Rawls stated that "[a]mong the essential features of this situation is that no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
future in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like .... The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance." Id. Rawls also
proclaimed that "[slince all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to
favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or
bargain." Id. Lastly, Rawls declared that:
Justice denies that loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by
others. The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons as if
they were one person is excluded. Therefore in a just society, the basic liberties are
taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargain-
ing or to the calculus of social interests.
Id. at 28.
23 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAw 15-37, 193-203 (St. Mar-
tin's Press 1986) (discussing equality mandate of Brown and problems inherent in opera-
tionalizing mandate into sound public policy).
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pen. A 1994 Harris survey of Americans with disabilities, spon-
sored by the National Organization on Disability, reported an in-
crease in the unemployment rate of working age adults with disa-
bilities, from sixty-six percent in 1986 to sixty-eight percent in
1994.24 Social institutions are resistant to change. Even where
they demonstrate the will, they often lack the resources and the
technical know-how. Even where initial gains are made at the
margins, second generation problems arise at the core.
As the experience of thirty years of civil rights statutes has
proven, controversial laws of this nature emerge from the policy-
making process with much left unsaid. As a result, they inevita-
bly get caught in a web of litigation. Agencies fill in some details,
but we know that regulations are subject to court challenge.
Sometimes agencies also misread legislative intent on scope and
remedies. The agencies do not always foresee the intricate
problems that might arise in the implementation. Some issues
are so indeterminable or evolving that they just do not fit neatly
into rigid rules.
What the political forces cannot determine by consensus or fore-
sight, courts are called upon to decipher through artful statutory
interpretation. In recent years, however, the federal courts have
resisted this charge, throwing the "hard cases" back into the polit-
ical arena. While this legislative and judicial tug-of-war goes on,
the promise of inclusion remains an empty one for many. Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution may obviate the necessity, at least in
some cases, for resorting to lengthy and costly litigation.
The Americans with Disabilities Act 25 was a phenomenal vic-
tory for civil rights, and for the disabled in particular, despite im-
plementation problems. As a result of this comprehensive piece of
legislation, more Americans than ever are moving towards full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.
These goals, while seemingly ambitious, go beyond the rights of
the disabled, and look toward the economic well being of the na-
tion. We should not lose sight of this fact as we struggle to strike
an equitable balance between the interests of those protected
under the ADA, and those of the larger society. Nor should we
24 Peter D. Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79 IowA L. REv. 853, 873 n.95
(1994).
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. V 1993).
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forget that not all interests fit neatly into a cost benefit analysis.
Justice cannot always be quantified. At times as a nation, we
must choose to take the moral "high road", simply because it's the
right thing to do.
